We have frequently posted, some may say tiresomely, about the lack of consequences or negative incentives for health care organizational leaders involved in wrong-doing.  For example, see the numerous cases against health care organizations that resulted in legal settlements, almost never requiring any penalties against individuals who authorized, directed, or implemented the behavior in question.

Now a major article in the New York Times by Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story explains some of the history behind this aspect of the decreasing accountability of corporate leadership.  Their article focused on financial corporate leadership, but clearly is generalizable to health care corporate leadership.

Banks Asked to Report Their Own Misbehavior

The Times article documents how the US Department of Justice deliberately became more lenient in the 1990s, supposedly to conserve scarce investigational resources:

dating to the mid-1990s … banks were asked to regularly report suspicious activities to the Treasury Department, an effort that aimed at relieving regulators of some of their enforcement loads.

The Effect of the Arthur Andersen Case

Around the beginning of the 21st century there had been some vigorous prosecution of corporate financial wrong-doing:

The names have become synonymous with corporate wrongdoing — and forceful prosecution: Not just Enron, but also WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Rite Aid and ImClone. In the early part of the last decade, senior executives at all these companies were convicted and imprisoned.

However, for reasons that were not explained, a single unsuccessful case caused reconsideration of this approach:

The department began pulling back from a more aggressive pursuit of white-collar crime around 2005, say defense lawyers and former prosecutors, after the Supreme Court overturned a conviction it won against the accounting firm Arthur Andersen. That ended an era of brass-knuckle prosecutions related to fraud at companies like Enron.

Sympathy for the Targets of Investigation

The pullback was rationalized for a sudden sympathy for the objects of investigation:

But by 2005, a debate was growing over aggressive prosecutions, as some business leaders had been criticizing the approach as perhaps too zealous.

That May, Justice Department officials met ahead of a session with a cross-agency group called the Corporate Fraud Task Force. It was weeks after Justice Department lawyers had presented to the Supreme Court their case against Arthur Andersen, which was seeking — successfully, it would turn out — to overturn its criminal fraud conviction in a prominent case.

In the meeting, the deputy attorney general at the time, James B. Comey, posed questions that surprised some attendees, according to two people there who asked to remain anonymous because they were not supposed to discuss private meetings.

Was American business being hurt by the Justice Department’s investigations?, Mr. Comey asked, according to these two people, who said they thought the message had come from others. He cautioned colleagues to be responsible. ‘It was a total retrenchment,’ one of the people said. ‘It was like we were going backwards.’

Mr. Comey said recently that he did not recall this conversation.

Around the same time, the Justice Department was developing instructions on dealing with companies under investigation — particularly companies that work with the government. It issued a memo in 2003 that gave companies more credit for cooperating than in the past. That message was reinforced in another memo in 2006.

As the first memo put it, ‘it is entirely proper in many investigations for a prosecutor to consider the corporation’s pre-indictment conduct, e.g., voluntary disclosure, cooperation, remediation or restitution, in determining whether to seek an indictment.’

During this period, the Justice Department increased the use of deferred prosecutions or even nonprosecution agreements.

Many well-known companies have benefited. In 2004, the American International Group, the giant insurer, paid $126 million when it entered a deferred prosecution agreement to settle investigations into claims that it had helped clients improperly burnish financial statements.

Deals over accounting improprieties also were struck that year by Computer Associates International, a technology company, and in 2005 by Bristol- Myers Squibb, a pharmaceutical concern. Prudential Financial entered into a deferred prosecution in 2006 over improper mutual fund trading.

Note that while the emphasis of this article was on the financial services industry, big health care organizations were also benefiting from more lenient treatment.  Note also that one firm given lenient treatment, AIG, went on to threaten collapse, a collapse that was feared could take down the entire world financial system, and hence was given a very generous government bail-out, which has not be paid back to this day. 

Formalized Leniency

In 2008, the approach was formalized:

As the financial storm brewed in the summer of 2008 and institutions feared for their survival, a bit of good news bubbled through large banks and the law firms that defend them.

Federal prosecutors officially adopted new guidelines about charging corporations with crimes — a softer approach that, longtime white-collar lawyers and former federal prosecutors say, helps explain the dearth of criminal cases despite a raft of inquiries into the financial crisis.

Though little noticed outside legal circles, the guidelines were welcomed by firms representing banks. The Justice Department’s directive, involving a process known as deferred prosecutions, signaled ‘an important step away from the more aggressive prosecutorial practices seen in some cases under their predecessors,’ Sullivan & Cromwell, a prominent Wall Street law firm, told clients in a memo that September.

The guidelines left open a possibility other than guilty or not guilty, giving leniency often if companies investigated and reported their own wrongdoing. In return, the government could enter into agreements to delay or cancel the prosecution if the companies promised to change their behavior.

Less Deterrence

The NY Times article documented a number of opinions that increasing leniency was resulting in less deterrence of bad behavior:

‘If you do not punish crimes, there’s really no reason they won’t happen again,’ said Mary Ramirez, a professor at Washburn University School of Law and a former assistant United States attorney. ‘I worry and so do a lot of economists that we have created no disincentives for committing fraud or white-collar crime, in particular in the financial space.’

Why So Much Sympathy from Prosecutors?

What was not really clear from the article is why US federal prosecutors seemed to go from their stereotypically tough on crime personas to bleeding hearts for corporate criminals. The one rationale the article provided from the Department of Justice was:

Defending the department’s approach, Alisa Finelli, a spokeswoman, said deferred prosecution agreements require that corporations pay penalties and restitution, correct criminal conduct and ‘achieve these results without causing the loss of jobs, the loss of pensions and other significant negative consequences to innocent parties who played no role in the criminal conduct, were unaware of it or were unable to prevent it.’

This, however, makes no sense. Well directed prosecutions of the people who apparently authorized, directed or implemented the wrong-doing ought to have very little effect on “innocent parties.” The only jobs and pensions that should be lost should be those of the accused.

Conclusions

This seems to be the most recently documented example of important but overlooked, or concealed changes in government policies that have enabled the health care system to become more unethical, dishonest and corrupt, and hence more dysfunctional.

Here we discussed a Supreme Court decision interpreting US anti-trust law that has been used to prevent medical societies from enforcing ethical rules, and hence helped medicine to become increasingly commercialized, and to increasingly put money ahead of patient care.

Here we discussed little discussed legislation from 1945 that allowed US insurance companies/ managed care organizations to avoid federal anti-trust investigation and enforcement, and hence to increased market power.

Here we discussed failure of the executive branch, and especially the Department of Justice to use existing legal doctrine, the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, available since 1943, to make corporate leaders responsible for their companies’ bad behaviors, leading to their increasing lack of accountability and less deterrence of malfeasance.

Now we have seen a deliberate turn away from even direct penalties on corporations which have misbehaved, in return basically for a promise that “we won’t do it again.”

The first two examples may be of unintended consequences.

The last two seem to signal an increased coziness between some in government and corporations. The origins of this coziness just beg for investigation.

Meanwhile, there seems to be no evidence that the government’s new leniency has protected innocent people who would have been harmed by the previous tougher approach. Instead, there seems to be a growing tide of bad behavior by health care organizations, exemplified by the nature of some of the bad behavior that lead to the march of legal settlements, and to the deferred prosecution agreements and corporate integrity agreements generated in response to the new policies.

What Is to Be Done?

- There clearly needs to be investigation, both by journalists and at a congressional level, of Department of Justice policies that have been increasingly lenient to and cozy with large corporations, including health care corporations.

- Current Department of Justice officials need to be reminded that their clients are the US people, not corporate executives, no matter how hearty and well-met.

ADDENDUM (12 July, 2011) -  See this related post on the Naked Capitalism blog.

ADDENDUM (19 July, 2011) – See related post by Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog.

We have frequently posted, first here in 2007, and more recently here and here, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC.

Since 1991, Medicare has set physicians’ payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians’ pay to the time and effort they expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities. Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1) A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, and understanding patients’ values and preferences when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients.

As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an “expert panel” that takes advantage of the organization’s First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.

To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation. Their names do not appear. A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that “a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide.” This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95 (although now with the notation that the product has been “discontinued.”) However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it. Thus, the RUC membership is at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(2) noted, RUC “meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair.” Furthermore, he stated, “proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review.”

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about it. We have posted (here, here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seemed to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seemed reluctant to even print its name.

That changed in October, 2010.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser Health News yielded two major articles about the RUC, here in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and here from the Center for Public Integrity (also reprinted by Kaiser Health News.) The articles covered the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its “secretive” nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.

So the RUC became less anechoic.  Now, four months later, there is more news.  A new site called “Replace the RUC!” has now appeared, with the following introduction:

This site has been developed – see here for our backgrounds – to help primary care physicians and other interested individuals obtain verifiable background from reputable sources on:

* The evolution and structure of the US’ medical payment system.
* How it came to devalue primary care and favor specialty services.
* How that has translated to lower quality care at far greater expense in the US.

We believe the overwhelming majority of American primary care physicians are deeply frustrated with the differences in how primary and specialty care are valued by the current system, and the havoc that system has wrought throughout health care and the nation.

The first step to remedying this situation is for the primary care medical societies to visibly and loudly withdraw from participation in the RUC, de-legitimizing the process.

That said, this effort is most decidedly NOT primarily about getting primary care physicians more money, but bringing our health system back into homeostasis.

We have previously noted that there are many unanswered questions about the RUC:

• How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
• Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
• How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
• Why does the AMA keep the membership of the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
• Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
• Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?

We welcome this new site as a way to answer these questions, and more importantly, as a way to develop more rational incentives within the health care system.

Note that “Replace the RUC!” will be added to our link list.

References



1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link here.)

Allegations that suggest the continuing degradation of the professionalism of employed physicians just appeared in the Palm Beach (FL) Post.  A former physician employee of Solantic Urgent Care, a for-profit chain of urgent care clinics, described to state investigators the life of employed physicians there.

Putting Revenue First

Physicians answered to managers who put revenue first:

Thirty-something business graduates lacking in any medical training supervised the clinics’ doctors and were encouraged to maintain an adversarial relationship with them, Prokes said.

Those clinic managers’ raises and bonuses depended on their achieving ambitious goals for patient visits, labor and overhead costs, per-patient revenues and customer satisfaction.

Prokes said clinic manager turnover was high, and a succession of managers wrote him up for a variety of infractions: arriving five minutes late, failing to suggest Solantic’s pharmacy at three points of contact and suggesting a patient might want to return later, when there would be less of a wait.

As is common elsewhere, there was pressure to see as many patients as possible:

Prokes told state investigators that he found the atmosphere increasingly untenable, as he was pressed to see 70 to 90 patients each day.

‘They actually told us not to sit down for 14-hour shifts,’ Prokes told state investigators. ‘[Former Solantic CEO Rick] (Scott) does not care about the quality of medicine. They care about how fast you see people.’

A Business Model from the Fast-Food Industry

A former Solantic executive admitted that the business model came straight from the fast-food industry:

[Former Solantic Chief Operating Officer Shaun] Ginter said the retail concept that he, Scott, and then-CEO Karen Bowling created drew on lessons from the fast food and other retail industries. Counters were built at standing height, for example, because it speeded workflow, he said.

‘The culture, the workflow, were all streamlined for a more efficient delivery, a more efficient method of care,’ said Ginter, who had previously managed drug stores with small clinics within. ‘The name of the game is keeping your costs tight, and Rick, Karen and myself were very focused on keeping costs down.’

Up-Selling Unneeded Services

Just as in the fast food industry, the help was expected to up-sell. In particular, Dr Prokes charged that physicians were strongly pushed to suggest services patients did not need, but that brought in more revenue:

Doctors were monitored with cameras in the clinics’ common areas, [Dr Randy] Prokes told investigators. Staff were expected to suggest extras, including vitamins and probiotics, and a colon cancer screening test considered unreliable and outdated by CDC officials.

The Background: Rick Scott, Columbia/HCA, and the State of Florida

Note that Rick Scott just sold Solantic LLC to private equity group Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe, per the Jacksonville (FL) Business Journal. Note further that Scott was the former CEO of Columbia/ HCA, which ultimately paid a huge fine for fraudulant practices:

John Schilling was working as reimbursement supervisor for Columbia/HCA’s Southwest Florida division, where he oversaw Medicare and Medicaid compliance and the cost reporting.

‘Before HCA, when it was just Columbia, the CEOs of the hospitals were making up to 100 percent of their salaries as a bonus; the CFOs made 50 percent. Even some of the directors were making 25 percent bonuses,’ Schilling said.

It drove a do-anything-to-make-the-numbers mentality, he said. Schilling now runs a firm called Ethics Solutions, where he helps potential whistleblowers.

‘There were no incentives for being in compliance with Medicare and Medicaid rules,’ Schilling said. ‘It was about, how are we going to make it profitable, and if we meet our goals, it means we get our bonuses.’

He found that the hospitals in his area kept two sets of books. The one for Medicare auditors showed inflated costs, so that hospitals could justify higher reimbursement rates to take advantage of a funding formula that has since changed.

The hospitals also kept ‘real’ books with different numbers. The discovery put him in an ethical bind, he said. When he took his concerns to a supervisor, he was told not to rock the boat. Ultimately, his whistleblower lawsuit proved among the most damaging to his employer, which eventually paid $1.7 billion to the federal government to settle criminal fraud and abuse charges.

Scott, who wanted to fight the charges rather than settle, was never charged, and said he was unaware of what his managers had been doing.

After Scott left Columbia / HCA, he used the riches he acquired as its hired executive to help fund an ultimately successful campaign for the governorship of Florida, his current office. (See posts here and here.)

Summary

We have previously posted, most recently here, about how physicians are increasingly becoming employees of for-profit corporations. We have discussed other instances in which such corporations are appearing to pressure physicians to provide “care” to patients in such a manner as to increase corporate revenue, whether or not it is good for patients. We noted that when insurance companies hire physicians, they are likely to push them into providing less care across the board, since the insurers are paid per patient, not for what is done to each patient. When hospitals, hospital systems, and other entities that directly provide care hire physicians, they are likely to push them into channeling patients to get tests, drugs, and procedures for which the corporations are most highly paid.

In this current case, the allegations fit the latter pattern. Furthermore, At least one former executive admitted that “the name of your game is keeping your costs tight,” not providing the best patient care.

There is more and more evidence that doctors who provide direct patient care as employees of for-profit corporations, and possibly other large organizations, are being increasingly pushed to put corporate revenue ahead of their patients’ best interests. It should be obvious that this is unethical. Doctors swear oaths to put their patients’ interests first.

Patients should be extremely wary of the care provided by doctors who are employed by large organizations. Doctors should be extremely wary of working for such organizations to provide direct patient care.

Below, I have repeated my humble suggestions from last week, with some additions, for

What Is to Be Done?

Patients:
- Find out if their physicians are employed, and if so, by whom.
- Find out what incentives their physicians have, if employed, to recommend more or less care of certain types.
- Find out whether other aspects of the physicians’ employment arrangements, e.g., contractual confidentiality clauses, could affect his or her relationships with patients
- Avoid doctors employed by for-profit companies who have incentives to provide more or less care than what may be best for the patient

Physicians:
- Do not accept any employment offer or contract which has incentives to provide more or less care than is best for individual patients
- Who are already employed disclose to their patients such employment, and any incentives it may provide to provide more or less care
- Urge professional societies, and certifying and accrediting organizations to further investigate threats to physicians’ professionalism arising from employment, and develop strategies to mitigate such threats

Policy-makers:
- Rapidly investigate the extent that for-profit companies whose revenues depend on physicians’ decisions are hiring physicians to take care of patients, and the incentives and influences that these companies use to affect physicians’ decisions
- Develop regulations that force disclosure of all such employment and relevant incentives and influences
- Consider further regulation of organizations that so employ physicians
- Consider whether such “commercial practice of medicine” ought to be once again banned.

ADDENDUM (12 July, 2011) -  See also this related post on KevinMD.

The case of the deadly contaminated heparin sold by Baxter International has received much less attention than seems warranted given its human costs (81 lives).  How the heparin was contaminated, and how the contaminated heparin ended up being sold as a US Food and Drug Administration approved American product are still unknown.  Our most recent post, here, noted that an investigation into the contamination of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API - actually the heparin itself) in China failed to produce any results, apparently because the Chinese government did not see fit to pursue it.  (Note that a brief summary of the whole case is at the end of this post.)
Now a new story in the Wall Street Journal by Alicia Mundy explains even more about why we do not know more about the contaminated heparin:

Baxter International Inc. faces a new challenge in federal court in its bid to block disclosure of documents about the 2008 contaminated-heparin crisis.

Baxter and Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC are fighting a civil mass tort lawsuit alleging deaths and injuries from imported Chinese heparin in 2007 and 2008. A company that isn’t party to that lawsuit says some of the information Baxter and SPL want to keep confidential is important to public health and drug safety, and could reveal information about the sources of toxic heparin in the Chinese supply chain.

The two companies want to keep under seal portions of depositions taken in the case, including those related to Momenta Pharmaceuticals Inc., which helped the U.S. government investigate the contamination. Baxter and SPL say they will be hurt if forced to disclose proprietary information.

They have denied that they were negligent in the deaths linked to the blood-thinning drug, widely used in cardiovascular and other conditions.

So,

On Aug. 3, federal Judge James Carr in Toledo, Ohio, ruled in favor of the confidentiality motion by Baxter and SPL.

On the other hand, there are arguments, admittedly by parties with relevant financial interests, for making more information public:

Last Friday, another company entered the fray, contending that the information in the depositions shouldn’t be sealed. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc. said public health could benefit if the depositions shed light on circumstances in China.

Amphastar, which has been competing with Momenta for approval to make a newer and more expensive form of heparin, said the information is also important to a congressional investigation into the Food and Drug Administration’s handling of the heparin crisis. Republican leaders of a House committee say the FDA failed to trace the contamination in the Chinese heparin supply chain.

On July 23, the FDA granted approval to Momenta to make the special heparin called enoxaparin, while Amphastar’s application remains on hold.

Amphastar said in its court filing that the ‘serious safety concerns’ involving heparin are relevant to enoxaparin because heparin is the starting material of enoxaparin’s active ingredient. Most U.S. heparin supplies come from China.

Of course, the companies who want to keep as much about the case secret as they can are not talking about it:

Lawyers for Baxter and SPL declined to comment on their efforts to restrict information related to Momenta. They referred inquiries to Baxter, whose spokeswoman declined to comment.

So here is more about what we do not know about the deadly contaminated heparin from China. One reason that this case has remained so anechoic is that the companies that sold and processed the contaminated heparin, and are now defendants in lawsuits have used that situation as a rationale for keeping ”proprietary” information secret.  There clearly may be reasons that Baxter International, the company that sold the heparin under their (formerly?) prestigious US label  wants to keep secret the details about what efforts it did or did not make to assure that the heparin it sold was pure and unadulterated. There clearly also may be reasons that Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, the US based company that sold the heparin API to Baxter wants to keep secret the details about what efforts it did or did not make to assure that the heparin API was pure and unadulterated. 

The ability of participants in lawsuits to keep “proprietary” information secret clearly adds to the anechoic effect.  Ironically, it may be that civil legal action, which is sometimes the only way to impose negative consequences on health care organizations that have misbehaved, may have the adverse effect of further hiding information about the events in question. 

However, to promote the safety of individual patients and the health of public, and to prevent another deadly case of drug contamination, understanding details about what happened is absolutely vital. The private pecuniary interests of Baxter International and Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC seem to be directly opposite to those of patients, physicians, and the public at large in this case. It is therefore disquieting to learn that the companies’ wishes to keep information they declare is “proprietary” seem to have trumped individual patient safety and public health concerns. (Note that these concerns go beyond the commercial concerns of Amphastar Pharmaceutical, although in this case the pecuniary interests of that company do not seem to be opposed to patient safety and the public health.)

If we really want a health care system that improves the health of individuals and the public, we need it to put health and safety concerns ahead of the incomes of health care corporations.  That such a statement seems not a platitude, but revolutionary is a mark of how our health care system has been turned on its head.

Case Summary


In summary, Baxter International imported the “active pharmaceutical ingredient” (API) of heparin, that is, in plainer language, the drug itself, from China. That API was then sold, with some minor processing, as a Baxter International product with a Baxter International label. The drug came from a sketchy supply chain that Baxter did not directly supervise, apparently originating in small “workshops” operating under primitive and unsanitary conditions without any meaningful inspection or supervision by the company, the Chinese government, or the FDA. The heparin proved to have been adulterated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), and many patients who received got seriously ill or died. While there have been investigations of how the adulteration adversely affected patients, to date, there have been no publicly reported investigations of how the OSCS got into the heparin, and who should have been responsible for overseeing the purity and safety of the product. Despite the facts that clearly patients died from receiving this adulterated drug, no individual has yet suffered any negative consequence for what amounted to poisoning of patients with a brand-name but adulterated pharmaceutical product.


(For a more detailed summary of the case, look here.)

The parade of legal settlements marches on.  The latest story is about Forest Laboratories and its marketing of Celexa (citalopram ) and Levothyroid (l-thyroxin).  Here is the most complete version, courtesy of Natasha Singer reporting for the New York Times. First, the lead sentence:

A unit of Forest Laboratories, the maker of the antidepressant Celexa, agreed on Wednesday to pay more than $313 million to settle criminal and civil complaints, including a claim that it had illegally promoted the drug for use in children.

Here are the charges:

Among the criminal charges was one that the subsidiary, Forest Pharmaceuticals, marketed Celexa, which was approved only for adult depression, to treat children and adolescents. The government also claimed that, in conjunction with the company’s off-label promotion, Forest publicized the positive results of a study on Celexa in adolescents while failing to tell doctors about a similar study that had negative results.

‘Forest Pharmaceuticals deliberately chose to pursue corporate profits over its obligations to the F.D.A. and the American public,’ Carmen Ortiz, the United States attorney for the District of Massachusetts, said in a statement Wednesday.

In addition, federal prosecutors accused Forest of paying doctors to induce them to prescribe Celexa and another antidepressant, Lexapro. The remuneration included ‘cash payments disguised as grants or consulting fees, expensive meals and lavish entertainment, and other valuable goods and services,’ the government said in its civil complaint.

Among the items that Forest sales representatives gave to doctors from 1998 to 2005, the complaint said, were tickets to St. Louis Cardinal games, which were to be ‘leveraged and sold as a reward for prescriptions’; a $1,000 gift certificate to Alain Ducasse, a gourmet French restaurant, for a high-prescribing child psychiatrist; a deep-sea fishing trip off Cape Cod for a doctor and his three sons; $400 in Broadway theater tickets for a doctor and his wife; and Red Sox tickets worth $2,276 to be used for doctors in the Boston area.

So we not just off-label marketing, but suppression of clinical research (of course, a study whose results were not favorable to the product being marketed), and payments to doctors as an “inducement to prescribe.”

But wait, there is more:

As part of the criminal settlement, Forest Pharmaceuticals, which is based in St. Louis, agreed to plead guilty to one felony count of obstructing justice, acknowledging that employees had lied to F.D.A. officials during a plant inspection in 2003.

The company also agreed to plead guilty to two misdemeanors, one of which covers the company’s misbranding of Celexa by marketing the antidepressant for use in children from 1998 to 2002.

The other misdemeanor covers the illegal distribution from 2001 to 2003 of an unapproved drug, Levothroid, to treat a thyroid hormone deficiency. Such thyroid pills, made by various drug makers, had been sold in the United States since the 1950s without F.D.A. approval. But in 2001, the agency told drug makers that they needed to reduce their distribution of such medications until the companies obtained agency approval to market the pills.

The criminal charges accused Forest of making a deliberate decision to continue distributing the drug in quantities exceeding the F.D.A.’s directive. After the agency sent a warning letter to Forest, the company directed employees to work until 1 a.m. to continue shipping as much Levothroid as possible, according to the criminal complaint.

So there was also obstruction of justice in the form of lying to the FDA, and selling drugs that the FDA had ordered not to be sold.

So what are the penalties?

The criminal settlement calls for the company to pay a $150 million fine and to forfeit an additional $14 million in assets. Forest will also pay more than $88 million to the federal government and more than $60 million to the states to resolve a civil complaint that its actions caused false claims to be submitted to federal health care programs. In addition, two whistle-blowers will split $14 million from the federal share of the settlement.

Forest has also entered into a five-year corporate integrity agreement, requiring an independent expert to review the company’s compliance with drug marketing regulations.

So here we go again. A large drug company was up to no good, suppressing research, paying doctors for their prescriptions, lying to the FDA, and disobeying its orders.

The penalty seemed large, over $300 million. However, Celexa was a big revenue generator at the time the events above occurred, topping $1 billion in revenue first in 2002 (per Forbes here). Furthermore, as noted by Ed Silverman on Pharmalot, it seems no individual will suffer any negative consequences for authorizing, directing, or implementing the conduct described above. Finally, as best I can tell, despite the fact that a Forest subsidiary will plead guilty to a felony, the company is not going to be barred from doing business with the government. 

So, despite pleading guilty to a felony and three misdemeanors, neither Forest as a company nor any individual working for the company will really suffer very much.  On the other hand, the leaders of Forest have been doing very well.  The company’s CEO, Howard Solomon, was number 18 on Wall Street Journal list of the 25 highest paid CEOs over the last decade.  His total realized compensation was over $385 million over the last 10 years.  According to the company’s 2010 proxy statement, his total compensation in 2009 was $8,267,236.  The four other highest paid executives made from just over $2.5 million to $5.3 million.

So here we go again.  Another large health care organization has been found to have done wrong, but the only penalty is a fine that whose impact will be diffused across the whole company, and ultimately be paid by its employees, its customers, including patients, and its stockholders.  Meanwhile, the people who authorized, directed, or implemented the wrong doing apparently will pay nothing and receive no negative incentives.  Furthermore, the top leaders of the company, whose huge compensation in the past was increased by the results of the wrong doing, will continue to prosper.

As we have said again and again,  we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

By the way, the current case offers an avenue for those who do not like what Forest did to ask those who are supposed to be ultimately responsible for its behavior how this was allowed to happen.  The board of directors of the company is supposed to be ultimately accountable for the company’s actions.  As we have noted before, these directors are supposed to “demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company’s shareholders.” [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]

The current directors of Forest Laboratories, according to the company’s 2010 proxy statement, include Dr Nesli Basgoz, “Associate Chief for Clinical Affairs, Division of Infectious Diseases, Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH),” and “Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School.”  Also, it includes Dr Lester B Salans, “Clinical Professor” at Mount Sinai Medical School, not to mention Dr Peter J Zimetbaum, “Director of Clinical Cardiology” at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston (BIDMC), and “Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School.”   Maybe some enterprising student journalist will get to ask the good doctors how they let things at Forest get so ethically out of hand.

In many posts on this blog, Roy Poses has lamented the fact that there are no personal repercussions for healthcare executives embroiled in malfeasance and scandals.

He recently wrote:

So, here we go again … To repeat, seemingly ad infinitum, these are just the latest in a now long parade of settlements and guilty pleas and criminal convictions, sometimes involving charges like bribery, fraud, or kickbacks, that serve as reminders of poor behavior by myriad health care organizations. As we have previously noted, these settlements seem to have little deterrent effect on future bad behavior. (Note that many large health care organizations have settled or plead guilty in several major cases since we started commenting on such settlements.) Usually, the companies involved only need to pay fines, and no individual who performed, directed or approved unethical or illegal acts will suffer any negative consequences. I submit once again that such fines are viewed merely as costs of doing business by the affected companies, and do not deter future bad behavior. Until the people who approve, direct, and perform unethical or illegal acts pay some penalties, expect such acts to continue. I again suggest that to truly reform health care, we need rigorous regulation of health care organizations that has the power to deter unethical behavior that may risk patients’ health.

The companies of the bad actors are fined; the fine is considered a “cost of doing business”; but personal actions against the responsible executives engaged in malfeasance do not usually occur. Dr. Poses feels healthcare reform cannot occur under these conditions, and I agree.

Apparently, so do others at high levels:

FDA Criminal Division to Increase Prosecutions
Wall Street Journal
March 4, 2010

By ALICIA MUNDY

WASHINGTON—The Food and Drug Administration plans to increase prosecutions of pharmaceutical and food industry executives as part of an effort to refocus its criminal division, which has been under attack in Congress and is criticized in a new government report.

In a letter to Sen. Chuck Grassley (R., Iowa), the FDA says an internal committee has recommended that the FDA and its Office of Criminal Investigations “increase the appropriate use of misdemeanor prosecutions, which allows responsible corporate officials to be held accountable and is a valuable enforcement tool.”

Misdemeanor prosecutions are a start; however, some of the behaviors seem to my uninformed legal mind to perhaps be more felonious in nature…

An FDA official said the agency has the authority to prosecute corporate executives for criminal actions within their companies under a provision called “strict liability.” He said the government doesn’t have to show intent to defraud in order to get a conviction. He added that the provision is an important tool that hasn’t been used much in recent years.

As has been noted repeatedly on this blog.

A report set to be released Thursday by the Government Accountability Office, Congress’s watchdog arm, says the Office of Criminal Investigations has operated autonomously for years with little or no accountability to top FDA officials

… The report said the FDA “has relied largely on the OCI director to determine which aspects of OCI’s operations and investigations are made known to FDA’s top management.”

The GAO also said the FDA’s criminal unit has fallen short compared with other agencies in developing performance standards.

This clearly must be corrected.

The FDA officials largely agreed with the assessment and in the letter said the agency is “developing meaningful performance measures” for the criminal office as part of an initiative begun in August. The FDA said it wants the criminal office to share information with FDA leaders regularly, and to do a better job picking cases.

I know where they can look to find cases … here, for example.

… In 2008, Rep. Joe Barton (R., Texas) criticized the Office of Criminal Investigations, saying its budget had increased while its workload stagnated.

I think the many posts on healthcare corruption here and elsewhere suggest that the workload of the Office of Criminal Investigations needs to pick up quite substantially, if the behaviors are to be discouraged and the actors shown that the penalties are not just a “cost of doing business” (unless one is willing to acquire a criminal record or go to jail for one’s company as a “cost of doing business”, that is).

It is my hope that one day this increased vigilance will be extended to the healthcare IT industry.

– SS

The New York Times reports that a medical researcher faked claims to being a Rhodes Scholar, and that a major scandal that has erupted.

The scenario is very familiar to readers of Healthcare Renewal, with universities collecting millions from public sources and the pharmaceutical industry, turning a blind eye to credentials discrepancies of faculty “taxpayers”, and the public possibly put at risk through faulty research and suspect “reviews”:

Duke Scientist Suspended Over Rhodes Scholar Claims
New York Times
July 20, 2010

Duke University School of Medicine has suspended a researcher and stopped patient enrollment in three cancer studies upon learning of reports that the researcher had overstated his academic credentials.

One of the lead investigators on the cancer studies, Dr. Anil Potti, was placed on administrative leave, said Douglas J. Stokke, a spokesman for Duke, while the university investigates allegations that Dr. Potti had falsely claimed that he was a Rhodes scholar.

The controversy erupted late last week after an article published in The Cancer Letter (PDF), a weekly publication for cancer specialists, reported that Dr. Potti, an assistant professor of medicine, had on occasion exaggerated his credentials. (A spokeswoman at Rhodes House at Oxford confirmed on Tuesday that Dr. Potti had not received the scholarship.)

The scientist, Anil Potti, was engaged in cancer clinical trials using questionable and possbily erroneous analytical methods (prediction models).

In addition, several dozen biostatisticians and cancer researchers at Harvard, Princeton, Johns Hopkins and other academic institutions are now questioning the methodology behind the three clinical trials, urging a halt to the Duke studies — two on lung cancer and one on breast cancer — in a letter sent to the director of the National Cancer Institute.

He’d used the fake credentials to get American Cancer Society money:

When questions about Dr. Potti’s credentials became public, the American Cancer Society suspended payments of a five-year, $729,000 grant awarded to Dr. Potti to study the genetics of lung cancer. The society awarded the grant based in part on a résumé from the doctor that included the Rhodes honor, said Dr. Otis W. Brawley, the chief medical officer of the cancer society.

According to The Cancer Letter’s exposé linked above:

A high-profile cancer genomics researcher at Duke University claimed in multiple grant applications that he had been a Rhodes scholar, when, in fact, the Rhodes Trust states flatly that he was not.

Documents obtained by The Cancer Letter show that in biographies submitted to NIH, Duke oncologist and genomics researcher Anil Potti claimed variously to have won the prestigious scholarship in 1995 or 1996, depending on the version of the biography.

Potti also made the Rhodes claim in an application that resulted in a $729,000 grant from the American Cancer Society. “We don’t have any record that Anil Potti was a Rhodes scholar,” spokesman for the Rhodes Trust said to The Cancer Letter.

Assuming the fabrications are proven, a number of questions arise:

• How can a Duke scientist have gotten away with exaggerated credentials on a CV used in a grant applicationa to NIH, the American Cancer Society, and perhaps other organizations, claiming to be a Rhodes Scholar?
• Did he make similar exaggerations in his application to Duke itself?
• Do the exaggerations made in NIH and/or other federal grant applications constitute a crime, e.g., under Title 18 of U.S. Code, Section 1001 which makes it a federal crime to make a false statement to the government, according to one contributor to The Cancer Letter article?
• Will Duke act on fabrications as criminal matters?
• What were the Duke grants office and/or credentials-checking staff doing during their working hours?
• Why did this exaggeration come out in The Cancer Letter?

Patients may be at risk:

[MD Anderson Cancer Center biostatisticians] Keith Baggerly and Kevin Coombes said they devoted about 1,500 hours to checking Potti’s and Nevins’s work. These efforts—dubbed “forensic bioinformatics”—resulted in a paper in the November 2009, issue of the Annals of Applied Statistics.

“Unfortunately, poor documentation can shift from an inconvenience to an active danger when it obscures not just methods but errors,” the paper stated. “Patients in clinical trials are currently being allocated to treatment arms on the basis of these results.”

The two raised questions about Duke’s randomized phase II single-institution trials that used the Nevins and Potti technology to assign patients to treatment (NCT00545948, NCT00509366, and NCT00636441). Baggerly and Coombes argued that these trials “may be putting patients at risk.”

Duke initially suspended but then restarted the trials after an “investigation” by outside scientists. However:

Experts asked by The Cancer Letter to review these [investigation] documents [obtained under the FOIA] noted that Duke deans Cuffe and Kornbluth were inaccurate in their description of the document’s substance and conclusions when they announced completion of the investigation and resumption of the clinical trials earlier this year.

“Having read the committee’s report, we must disagree with Duke’s representation of the committee’s findings,” Baggerly and Coombes said in an email after reviewing the documents released under FOIA. The committee stated that “In our review of the methods … we were unable to identify a place where the statistical methods were described in sufficient detail to independently replicate the findings of the papers,” and further noted that the Duke investigators “really need” to work on “clearly explaining the specific statistical steps used in developing the predictors and the prospective sample assignments.”

Duke has apparently now decided to stonewall:

… The Cancer Letter sent an email with questions to Potti, his collaborator Joseph Nevins, and Duke administration officials. The questions focused on the Rhodes claim, but also touched on other apparent discrepancies.

Responding to everyone on the email CC list, including this reporter, Potti wrote: “Sounds like I need to call him to clarify …… and probably also talk with you all to clarify. I was a nominee….. and several of the others can also be explained. –Anil.”

After that email, Potti and Duke officials didn’t respond to questions seeking details that could substantiate this response. Multiple calls and emails from The Cancer Letter were not acknowledged.

One reason is that this escapade appears to have many twists and turns regarding credentials claimed by their researcher in the past. See the full article published in The Cancer Letter (PDF). The tale is stunning.

Another reason appears to be this:

Genomic research led by the two scientists [Potti and senior collaborator Joseph Nevins] has brought millions of public and private dollars to Duke. The duo’s connections with the industry are considerable. According to a recent disclosure, Potti is a member of the scientific advisory boards of Eli Lilly and Co., GlaxoSmith-Kline, and CancerGuideDx.

This also raises the questions:

• Did Potti misrepresent his credentials to these pharmas?

• Was Nevins aware of these exaggerations himself?

Of course this author is familiar with laxity in Duke’s management and academics, and their not replying to pointed questions on their failures.

Perhaps at the time of this grant application, Duke personnel were busy checking the credentials of the Duke Lacrosse team, or of academics such as myself, maligned by Duke professors for having a strong sense of ethics. I then found myself “stonewalled” by Duke’s President Richard H. Brodhead on the issues.

(See my Jan. 2008 post “A Truly Appalling Lawsuit Against Duke University” for more on that affair.)

– SS

Interesting item seen here:

From Dabney: “Re: former Sentillion exec departures from Microsoft. Microsoft transferred their 800 Health Solutions Group people into the small-to-medium commercial sector group (Microsoft Business Solutions) last Monday. Peter Neupert and his whole organization have been pushed out of the incubation group in Microsoft Research with the guys who sell Microsoft Axapta ERP and CRM for small commercial customers. That will mark the end of acquisitions and spending of Microsoft on health because they haven’t had any significant sales of Amalga UIS in the past year after already withdrawing Amalga HIS and Amalga RIS/PACS from the market. Microsoft is slowly edging towards an exit stage left in health IT.

Why would this not surprise me if true?

Because I predicted it.

In July 2006, nearly 5 years ago, in my July 2006 post “Bill, Have You Lost Your Mind?“

Nobody was listening, just as nobody seems to be listening to my current dire predictions for the National Program for IT in the HHS™ .

Wait until 2016…

– SS

Per Ed Silverman on the Pharmalot blog, we hear of new concerns about a company in the supply chain that ended up with adulterated heparin and dead patients.  Before summarizing what the blog reported, let me summarize the case again.

Case Summary

- We have posted several times, recently here, about the tragic case of suddenly allergenic heparin. Although heparin, an intravenous biologic anti-coagulant, has been in use for over 70 years, serious allergic reactions to it had heretofore been rare. Starting in 2008, hundreds of such reactions, and now over 80 deaths were reported in the US after intravenous heparin infusions.All the heparin related to these events in the US was sold by Baxter International.
- We then learned that although the heparin carried the Baxter label, it was not really made by Baxter. The company had outsourced production of the active ingredient to a long, and ultimately mysterious supply chain. Baxter got the active ingredient from a US company, Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, which in turn obtained it from a factory in China operated by Changzhou SPL, which in turn was owned by Scientific Protein Laboratories and by Changzhou Techpool Pharmaceutical Co. Changzhou SPL, in turn, got it from several consolidators or wholesalers, who in turn got it from numerous small, unidentified “workshops,” which seemed to produce the product in often primitive and unsanitary conditions. None of the stops in the Chinese supply chain had apparently been inspected by the US Food and Drug Administration nor its Chinese counterpart.
- The heparin proved to have been adulterated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), and many patients who received got seriously ill or died. While there have been investigations of how the adulteration adversely affected patients, to date, there have been no publicly reported investigations of how the OSCS got into the heparin, and who should have been responsible for overseeing the purity and safety of the product. Despite the facts that clearly patients died from receiving this adulterated drug, no individual has yet suffered any negative consequence for what amounted to poisoning of patients with a brand-name but adulterated pharmaceutical product.  (For a more detailed summary of the case, look here, and for all our posts on this topic, look here.)

The FDA Letter

Pharmalot reported that the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sent a warning letter dated January 20, 2011, to Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, and provided a link to the letter. 

The letter identified continuing serious problems with Scientific Protein Laboratories’ operations:

During our July 28, 2010 – September 3, 2010, inspection of your active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) manufacturing facility, Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, located at 700 E. Main Street, Waunakee, WI, investigators from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) identified significant deviations from Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) for the manufacture of drugs. These deviations cause your drugs to be adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) [21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B)] in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, their manufacture, processing, packing, or holding do not conform to, or are not operated or administered in conformity with CGMP.

The firm failed to adequately respond to complaints about its products, including heparin:

Failure to investigate all quality related complaints whether received orally or in writing according to a written procedure.

For example, your firm failed to conduct a formal investigation concerning a complaint identifying potential contamination with Oversulfated Chondroitin Sulfate (OSCS) in a lot of Heparin Sodium USP (lot 1035-0778) on October 9, 2008. Your firm did not initiate a formal investigation until September 9, 2009. In addition, at that time, your firm failed to extend your investigations to other lots of Heparin Sodium USP manufactured using the same crude lot identified with OSCS contamination. Your investigation did not consider the other lot of Heparin Sodium USP that was associated with the same contaminated crude lot until May 26, 2010, eight months after initiating a formal investigation (i.e., lot 1035-0780, which tested negative for OSCS in June 2010). We acknowledge that you initiated a voluntary recall of Heparin Sodium USP that included lots 1035-0778 and 1035-0780 on October 13, 2010.

In your response, your firm notes that you have revised your procedure to state, “Any SPL employee will inform QA of a customer complaint.” However, this response does not address the fundamental issues that allowed the delays in communications and investigation to occur. Your handling of the heparin contamination complaint suggests the need to evaluate training across all departments about the types of information requiring prompt reporting to the quality unit. Further, your response does not address how you will ensure that complaint investigations are handled in a timely manner.

Also, the firm still had problems overseeing the work of companies that supplied it:

Your firm failed to properly evaluate a contract laboratory to ensure GMP compliance of operations occurring at the contract site

Furthermore, it did not use the proper equipment:

Failure to have equipment for the manufacture of APIs of appropriate design for its intended use.

The FDA seemed concerned that company management did not understand its responsibilities:

The manner in which you addressed this problem [the contamination of the heparin] is very worrisome with respect to the timeliness of the investigation, the identification of all potentially affected drugs, and implementing appropriate actions to resolve these issues. Be advised that your firm has the responsibility to ensure the quality, safety, and integrity of its drugs. FDA expects that your corporate management will immediately undertake a comprehensive evaluation of your quality system to ensure comprehensive compliance with CGMP.

In addition,

However, we are concerned about your firm’s fundamental understanding of what is required by your Quality Unit and the regulatory expectations for a firm that enters into agreements with contract testing laboratories. Although you have agreements with other firms that may delineate specific responsibilities to each party, you are ultimately responsible for the quality of your products and the reliability of test results. Regardless of who tests your products or the agreements in place, you are required to manufacture these products in accordance with section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Act to assure their identity, strength, quality, purity, and safety.

Summary

In previous discussions of the case of the adulterated heparin I speculated about reasons that the current leaders of health care corporations may have abandoned their most fundamental responsibilities, for example:

I submit that corporate cultures increasingly influenced by the arrogant, greedy, amoral leadership of the financial services industry that lead us to the brink of another depression are also leading us to the brink of a poisonous era in health care. Corporate leaders intent on cutting costs, and paying themselves as much of the resulting proceeds as possible, may see quality and safety as just another cost cutting target. Corporate leaders brought up in the culture of finance, but untrained and inexperienced in engineering, science, and medicine find it all too easy to ignore quality and safety and focus on the bottom line.

The FDA letter to Scientific Protein Laboratories seems to confirm my fear that leaders of health care corporations no longer seem to understand their most elementary responsibilities for providing safe products, in this case, pure, unadulterated drugs. It did not speak to why that may be the case, but certainly does not contradict my theory above.

The letter provides some reassurance that the FDA, at least, has not forgotten the case of the adulterated heparin. However, despite the number of deaths involved, this case has been relatively anechoic, and never fully investigated.

So here I go again: as long as the leaders of health care organizations are not held accountable for the results of their decisions on health care quality, cost, and access (even in such extreme quality violations as those resulting in multiple patient deaths), we can expect continuing decisions that sacrifice quality, increase costs, and worsen access, but that are in the self-interest of the people making them.

To really reform health care, we must hold health care organizations and their leaders accountable (and not blame all the problems on doctors, other health care professionals, patients, and society at large).

We have discussed a few examples of the revolving door, involving government officials who dealt with health care issues leaving to eventually take jobs for for-profit health care corporations. 

The latest, and most vivid example of the revolving door was just in an article by Duff Wilson in the New York Times:

Michael K. Loucks was arguably the nation’s most influential prosecutor of health care fraud.

He racked up numerous convictions and mega-settlements in nearly a quarter-century, using whistle-blowers and secret grand juries to pressure major pharmaceutical and health companies into ending illegal practices like kickbacks to doctors and misuse of blockbuster drugs.

Once described as a cross between a firebrand preacher and a charismatic litigator, Mr. Loucks burnished a reputation aptly captured in a Fortune magazine headline: ‘Why Do Drug Companies Fear This Man? Maybe because he’s declared all-out war on cheats in the drug industry.’

But a year and a half ago, Mr. Loucks, a Republican, left the United States attorney’s office in Boston after he was passed over for the top post and President Obama appointed a Democrat. Instead, Mr. Loucks joined Skadden, Arps last July, and has startled former allies by emerging in recent months as zealous a corporate defender as he was a prosecutor, complete with proposals seeking more lenient treatment for the medical companies he once vilified.

In a six-page memo last month to clients in his portfolio, which may include some of the very same corporations he prosecuted repeatedly, Mr. Loucks bemoaned strategies he had embraced.

Note that we noted what Duff Wilson called Mr Loucks “crowning achievement” here.

This case was particularly striking because Mr Loucks was not merely involved with government health care policy.  He was prosecuting alleged wrongdoing by health care corporations while within government.  However, now he is defending the same companies whose actions he once called “evil.”

This generates concern that those in government charged with keeping health care corporations honest at best regard what they are doing as simply some kind of game, and at worst, as an avenue to future more lucrative corporate positions.

This was reinforced at the conclusion of the Wilson article, in which Duff Wilson challenged Mr Loucks that his new job was considered by some to going “over to the dark side.” Earlier in the piece, Mr Loucks made the usual response of an attorney defending an apparently unsavory client.

While everyone calls it ‘the other side,’ I’m doing the same thing I’ve always done, which is zealously representing my clients.

But then he added a sports analogy:

For his part, Mr. Loucks uses a baseball reference. Johnny Damon left his beloved Boston Red Sox in late 2005 to sign with ‘the evil empire, the New York Yankees,’ Mr. Loucks said. Both teams won World Series with help from Mr. Damon.

Asked whether the ‘evil empire’ analogy fit the Justice Department or Skadden, Mr. Loucks said, ‘One man’s evil empire is another’s home team.’

I do live in Red Sox Nation, and some people around here do call the New York Yankees the “evil empire.” I am sure nearly all of them realize that this is just sports fans’ hyperbole.

So Mr Loucks, the trained lawyer and former federal prosecutor, rationalized his new, lucrative position defending the companies whose conduct he once called “evil” with a logical fallacy. As best as I can determine, that fallacy was a hasty generalization with this structure: He took a sample of a single organization called an “evil empire,” (the NY Yankees). He noted correctly  that this one organization is not really an evil empire, but some peoples’ baseball home team. He then made the hasty generalization that because one organization popularly called an “evil empire” is not actually evil, no entities labelled “evil empires”are any  more evil than the Yankees. 

One wonders if other government regulators regard what they do as having no greater ethical consequences as the decision to swing on a pitch down and in? 

Again, it all has the aroma of corporatism, of government and corporate leaders who see each other as insiders with common interests, and who feel more commonality with each other than with the hicks in the general population.  In that case, can we trust such government regulators to protect the interests of the people whom they are supposed to protect?